When an Apology is not an Apology

As part of their plea deals, lawyers Sidney Powell and Kenneth Chesebro were required to apologize for their roles in interfering with the elections in Georgia in 2020. They both pled guilty and were sentenced in October 2023. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution used an open records request to obtain the apologies that were offered at their plea hearings, and reported this week that they are each one sentence long, hand-written on notebook paper:

“I apologize to the citizens of the State of Georgia and to the citizens of Fulton County for my involvement in Count 15 of the indictment,” Kenneth Chesebro wrote.

“I apologize for my actions in connection with the events in Coffee County,” wrote Sidney Powell.

These are not apologies. They do not include enough of the elements of a good apology to meet the basic definition. When analyzing public apologies, I try to note what is good about the apology before zeroing on its deficiencies. Here, the most I can say is that the statements don’t shift blame to others. But neither do they really accept responsibility, an essential element of an apology. Often at sentencing hearings, the defendant does the opposite of what these two did — the defendant apologizes so profusely that their sincerity is tainted by the appearance of winning favor (a lighter sentence) from the judge. No worries about that here. No effort to take responsibility, acknowledge the harm done, articulate the specific actions that were so egregious, express remorse, or identify how they hope to behave differently in the future. One wonders why the judge accepted these as “apologies.” They’re not.

Stop Asking About Mental Health

Michigan’s State Court Administrative Office took some steps recently to align mediation rules regarding parties’ mental health with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Mediators were previously encouraged to screen for mental health issues that might contribute to domestic violence, as part of the Domestic Violence Screening Protocol. For example, in assessing a party’s ability to negotiate, the Protocol used to recommend that a mediator ask a party, “Do you believe mental health (illness) issues or emotional problems have ever caused difficulties for either of you?” (Section 6). That question has now been omitted. The Protocol used to suggest “mental illness” as a reason a mediator could give to decline mediation without mentioning domestic violence; that too has now been deleted. (Section H.4.) The ADA – which applies to mediation – protects the privacy of an individual with a psychiatric disability, and leaves disclosure up to that person; it cannot be required. Omitting these questions from the DV Screening Protocol brings Michigan practice more in line with the ADA.

In conjunction with the changes to the DV Screening Protocol, SCAO also revised the Mediator Standards of Conduct. Standard VI, “Safety of Mediation,” used to include “mental illness or other mental impairment” as one of several examples of an impediment that would make mediation physically or emotionally unsafe for any participant. That phrase has now been deleted from the Standard.

I served on the SCAO-convened committee to update the Mediator Standards of Conduct in 2011-2012. At that time, Michigan’s Standards of Conduct were just two pages long, and did not address domestic relations mediation. There were ABA Model Standards of Conduct for general civil mediators, and Model Standards for Family and Divorce Mediation, so we decided to merge the two into one set of standards that would cover all types of mediation. What is now Standard VI, Safety of Mediation, is the sole provision that had no corollary in the ABA Model Standards of Conduct; while the “safety” concept came from the family mediation standards, they contain no mention of mental illness. Omitting this phrase lines up the Michigan standard with other national standards. The Association of Professional Family Mediators Standards of Practice permit a mediator to suspend or terminate the mediation, among other reasons, “when a participant is unable to participate due to … a debilitating physical or mental condition.” (Standard X.A.3) That seems less intrusive than asking about mental health  ahead of the mediation.

Although the screening protocol was designed for domestic relations cases, it’s a wise practice to use it in every case. Skipping the questions about mental health will take some adjustment but will better respect the privacy of parties to mediation.

Mediator Testifies

The Facts: A volunteer mediator for a community mediation center conducted a Zoom mediation in a domestic case over the issue of parenting time. Each party had an attorney, although the attorneys were not present in the mediation. The parties reached an agreement, after the father checked in by phone with his attorney. The mediator asked each party to read half of the agreement while the other listened, to ensure that the document comprised their full agreement. The parties signed the agreement. The father subsequently claimed that the agreement omitted a provision on parenting time during the summer that the parties had discussed. Father’s attorney apparently had a conversation with center staff that lead the attorney to believe that the mediator would agree with hhis position. So the father made a motion to amend the mediation agreement, and subpoenaed the mediator to testify.

The Hearing: At the hearing this week, the parties produced a waiver of confidentiality, permitting the mediator to testify. (See MCR 2.412(D)(1)). The mother’s attorney argued that the mediation agreement was complete. When questioned by father’s attorney, the mediator said he could not recall whether the parties discussed summer parenting time, so the father’s attorney withdrew the motion.

The Learnings: No one welcomes a subpoena, especially mediators being asked to testify about what happened in a mediation. Mediation is generally confidential, and mediators can challenge on that ground, but when the parties waive confidentiality, the mediator lacks a legal reason not to testify.

In this case, the mediator did not know until the hearing that the parties had waived confidentiality. The mediator could have contacted mother’s attorney to hear her view of the father’s motion, in which case the mediator might have learned about the waiver. Perhaps the mediator could’ve contacted the father’s attorney to encourage him to find some other way to resolve this issue besides having the mediator testify. If the parties’ agreement had included a clause in their agreement to the effect that any issues that arise in implementing the agreement would be resolved through mediation, perhaps the hearing could have been avoided altogether, and the parties could have returned to mediation to resolve the matter.

I know of only a few cases where mediators have actually testified. Usually it’s a situation like this where the parties have waived confidentiality, but occasionally the mediator wants to testify to clarify an erroneous assertion made by a party. To preserve the general confidentiality of mediation, it seems like it’s best for mediators to refrain from testifying if possible.

King Charles Doesn’t Fully Apologize to Kenyans

The controversy over King Charles’s remarks in Kenya this week highlights the difference between a “full-blown” apology and a statement of regret. King Charles sounded quite sincere when he noted, “The wrongdoings of the past are the source of greatest sorrow and deepest regret” regarding colonial atrocities by British forces in Kenya in the 1950s. But he is being faulted for failing to deliver an apology – so, what’s missing?

The 4 R’s are a good way to summarize the elements of an effective apology:

  1. Remorse/regret
  2. Responsibility for a specific act
  3. Restitution/repair
  4. Reform behavior

King Charles nailed the first element, the remorse or regret. But the second element is missing. This is not surprising, since King Charles was not personally responsible for those wrongs, and an apology on behalf of a group for wrongs it committed when one was a child is complicated. He did address one aspect of “responsibility,” which is to name the wrong done. King Charles is not denying that the British military committed “abhorrent and unjustifiable acts of violence against Kenyans.” Acknowledging the harm done pushes this beyond a mere statement of regret, even if it’s not a full apology.

Prior to the King’s visit to Kenya, the Kenya Human Rights Commission – perhaps anticipating this less-than-satisfactory result — called on King Charles to offer an “unconditional and unequivocal public apology (as opposed to the very cautious, self-preserving and protective statements of regrets).” The king chose to limit his statement to regrets. The BBC reports that a formal apology would have to be decided by government ministers. So perhaps, under the circumstances, the king went as far as he could towards a full apology.

Many Kenyans would say that another missing element is the third one, a promise of reparations. They would say the king missed two out of the three components they were hoping to hear. While this would also require government action, some suggest the king could donate to Kenya from his own personal treasury. The king apparently isn’t prepared to do that, but he did offer a different form of “repair,” by noting that he plans to study this topic to deepen his own understanding.

A Plea-Deal Apology by a Trump Lawyer

Jenna Ellis, one of President Donald Trump’s attorneys after the November 2020 election, pled guilty this week in a Georgia court to aiding and abetting false statements and writings, a felony. In December 2020, she joined Trump attorneys Rudy Giuliani and Ray Smith in making false allegations to the Georgia Senate Judiciary Committee that thousands of unregistered, under-age, and dead people voted in Georgia on November 3, 2020. Her plea deal included no jail time, five years probation, $5,000 restitution to the State of Georgia, 100 hours of community service, cooperation with the state to testify if needed – and to write an apology letter to the citizens of the state of Georgia, which she read at her plea hearing on October 24, 2023.

Her apology begins with her high standards for herself, “both as a lawyer and as a Christian.” Because she never mentions how seriously she compromised those standards, the effect of this is to imply that she’s really not a bad person, she just made this one little mistake. There should’ve been another sentence along the lines of, “I failed to live up to those standards.”

She says she wanted to challenge the 2020 presidential election results “in a just and legal way,” without offering why she felt they needed to be challenged at all. She notes that she “relied on others, including lawyers with many more years of experience than I, to provide me with true and reliable information.” She is presumably referring here to Rudy Giuliani and Ray Smith. She does not explain why she chose to listen to these two lawyers instead of to thousands of other experienced lawyers and judges. Instead, she seems to compare their experience with her inexperience so as to justify her gullibility. It would’ve been better to omit the reference to their “years of experience,” because it diminishes her ownership of her own failings, which is an essential element of a good apology. Or she could’ve distanced herself from it, e.g., “at the time, I thought they could be trusted because they had many years of experience, but I realize now that I should not have relied on that.”

She gets to the heart of it: “What I did not do, but should have done, was to make sure that the facts the other lawyers alleged to be true were in fact true …. I failed to do my due diligence.” She takes responsibility; good. But she blames her failure on the “frenetic pace of attempting to raise challenges in several states,” as if that excuses the lack of due diligence. Like, you didn’t have time to determine whether the statements were true before you began asserting them? Her apology would sound more sincere if she had just omitted that allusion to time constraints. Or, again, distance herself: “At the time, it felt like everything was happening too fast to verify things, but that was the wrong perspective.”

“I look back on this whole experience with deep remorse for those failures of mine. If I knew then what I know now, I would have declined to represent Donald Trump in these post-election challenges.” This part sounds sincere. Some expression of regret or remorse is another essential element of a good apology.

If you were the judge, would you have accepted this apology? I don’t think I would. “Failure to do due diligence” isn’t a felony. Lying is. She never admitted that she lied. Instead, she implied that she was too young and too busy to find out the truth, and that her biggest mistake was to trust experienced lawyers. If she were a teenager, this might suffice. But not for a lawyer who was 36 years old at the time. Perhaps for this reason, the Colorado bar has censured her. The Washington Post reports that, after she cut a deal with the Colorado bar to avoid disbarment, she clarified that lying requires intentionally making a false statement, and “I never did that, nor did I stipulate to or admit that.”